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11 ••• the decline of protectionism has lCQged behind the rise
of America's oompetitive streD;Jth in world markets... OUr
tariff law reflects l:x>th sides of the shield of public
opinion - adesire to expand trade and a growing fear of
foreign canpetition. • . Congress is left to reconcile, as
best as it can, the growing demand for export markets with
the conflicting claim that canpetition fran cheap foreign
labor destroys American iIxiustry."
Don D. Humphrey,
Anerican Imports,
New York 1955, p. VIII
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The following canparison of T.R. 's and F.D.R. 's foreign tra1e
policies wouldn' t make nuch sense if it was motivated ooly by the fact
that both Roosevelts were offsprings cf a fanily of Zeeland origin.
There is sanewhat IIDre to it. Under both presidents, U.S. foreign
econanic policies were in need of adaption to the lea1ing role the
U.S. econany hcd a~uired in the world econany. They both arranged for
reciprocity agreenents in traje with foreign countries and fought for
the oPen-door principle to protect American tra::le interests vis-a-vis
increasing discrimination arrl protection in international traje. Yet,
the econanic arrl political environment, the shape arrl substance, and
the outcane cf their tra::le policies were quite different.
I shall try to discuss the two approaches tD adapt U.S. trooe
policies to the requirements of the twentieth-<:entury national
interest of the United States in the following order. I .shall first
draw a picture of the economic conditions that preceeded the two
inaugurations. Thereafter, I shall discuss the Republican trade p:>licy
responses under T.R. and the Dernocratic policy responses 1.11der F .D.R.
Am finally, I shall try to canpare the two policy approaches and to
draw a lesson for today I s traje policy makir:g.
Ir. The Economic Condi tions
Economic developnent in the United States - vis-a-vis Great Britain
a relative latecomer in the process cf industrialization - was IIDre
rapid and stronger in the 19th century than in any other part cf the
world of similar size. In that t=ericd the U.S. exhibited a higher
population growth than aIrf other ronparable area. It was rot rnainly
due to inunigration, but to an extremely high difference between the
birth and the death rates. This reflected exceptionally favorable
econanic condi tions that allowed for narria;;,es and procreation at a
very early age. 1 In this process the fanous IIfrontier ll was pushed
constantly further westwards and the gradual expansion of population
across the entire continent provided for a rapidly growiD'J market for
American as weIl as foreign manufactures. In that period America was
inporting capital and in foreign trade imports were generally higher
than exports. Econanic growth ex>ncentrated on the domestic market,
which was shielded against tI'lwelcorne foreign competition by high
protective tariffs, especially since the Republican Party had
daninated poli tics in Washington since 1861 •2
Yet, by the end of the century this situation had changed
fundarnentally. By the 1890s the frontier had vanished and the
irrlustrial output of the U.S. had grown to l::e larger than that of any
other nation in the world. 3 Starting with the so<alled Great
Depression in 1874, which lasted until the mid-1890s, the US. tra::1e
balance showed ITOstly arrl fran 1893 on onlysurplusses. U.S. exports
explcded at the end of the Great Depression and helped to pull the
American econany out of it. Fron 1895 to 1901, the yea.r in \obich T.R.
was inaugurated , exports in real tenns grew at an ~verage annual rate
of 8.4 Percent a:mpared to a growth rate for real GNP of 5.4 percent.
Sani- arrl finished non-food manufactures had reached 32 percent of
total U.S. exports in 1901 ex>mpared to cnly 16 IEI"cent in 1870 cn3 26
percent in 1895. U.S. industries had also substituted their own
products for imports, as the share of imported finished rnanufactures
in total inports had dropPed fran about half in the 1850s to about a
quarter in the 1890s. 4
When T.R. took office in Sept. 1901, U.S. manufacturers and
investors had already recognized the vital importance of export
markets to absorb the growing output n:>t only of the highly productive
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American cgricultural sector , but now also cf the i.n1ustrial sector ,
at that time the biggest and rost vigorous in the world. Although
still an international net debtor until the First World War, the U.S.,
from the turn of the century onwards, started to export rrore capital
than it was irnporting. While in 1908 70 percent of u.s. lorg-term
capital exports were invested in Canada and Latin Arnerica,5 Europe was
by far the foremost u.s. foreign tradirg partner. 6
This basic structure of u.s. foreign trade and investments still
prevailed when F.D.R. became President, although the American
continent ha1, at the expense of Ellrope, gained oomewhat in irnportance
as a trading partner of the u.s. and Europe.bad assumed a more
prominent role in U.S. foreign investments. fut by the time F .D.R. was
inaugurated, the U.S. economy ha1 even lI'Ore fully denonstrated its
daninant posi tion in the world. While the First World War ha1 weakened
the rival econanies of Europe, it had provided for a big boost to
production and income in the U.S. lefore arrl after U.S. entry into the
war in April 1917, the European Allies had placed large orders for raw
arrl war materials as weIl as foodstuffs in the U.S. These ha::1 been
paid for mainly by credits that initially Arnerican bankers, and fran
1917 onwards, the U.S. government ha1 granted for this prrpose. In
this way the U.S. had become not only an international net creditor,
but, by the end of the war, had far surpassed Great Britain eIl this
account.
As Germany, the strongest irrlustrial rival of the U.S. in the
decades before 1914, had been crippled in its international trade by
i
. I the Allied blockade throughout the war , U.S. exports to non-
belligerent areas, like Latin America arrl Asia, had also risen
s trongly • Wi th Gennan competition eliminated on the American domestic
market, U.S. industries had moved into new production lines to
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substitute for German i.ßports, e.g. of dye stuffs aOO other c:hemica1s.
The nunitions, steel, shipbuildin;J aOO rotor vehicle iIxiustries had
expanded not only their production, but their production capacities .
enorIOC>usly, as - by the Wö!i - bad American cgriculture.7
After a sharp, but relatively short postwar depression in 1920/21
the boan of the 1920s provided for an U1interrupted further strong
growth of American iIrlustIy till the end of the decade. Prosperity was
based on the rapidly expandin;J domestic demarxi for ronstruction and
such new consurner durables as the autanobile and electrical household
appliances. 8 In addition, the U.S. continued to exfOrt large
quantities of capital and thus contributed to the economic
reconstruction of Europe. But while real GNP in the U.S. increased
--r
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about 40 percent fran 1919 to 1929, real export growth did not even
reach 10 percent. 9
World War . One hcrl not only reshaPed the map of Europe
geographically, but had resulted in a ~ld cf either new or higher
trade barriers, just at the time when U.S. export products bad becane
more vulnerable to them than ever before. The share of sani- aOO
finished non-food manufaetures in total U.S. exfOrts hcd reached 45
percent in 1919 and even 63 percent in 1929. 10 And it was at these
industrial prooucts that the postwar protectionism abrocrl was
primarily targeted, in contrast to raw materials and foodstuffs, the
inport of which foreign countries mostly needed to feed their
irrlustrial machinery aOO their fOpulation respectively. Desperate for
foreign exchange not anly to overcome balance cf payments deficits arrl
currency instabilities, but also to pay for reparations ar interallied
war debts, European nations tended to J:e protectionist and even Great
Britain ended its long tradition of free and undiscriminated tra1e. 11
The U.S. was l'lOW not only the lea1in;J international net creditor, but
also in an outstandin;J industrial oompetitive position J:ein;J at the
4
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same time free of balance cf payments problems. att instead cf leadirg
the way towards freer trcOe, i t revertOO to protectionism, when the
Republican Party, traditionally a high-tariff advocate, regainOO
control of the White House in 1921 (Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 a.OO.
the Fordney-MCCurrber Act of 1922). Thus EuroPean war and reParation
debtors hcrl a hard time earning by exports the foreign exchange needed
to pay their ultimate creditor in America. And American businesses
generally found markets abroad less profitable than those at home.
American capital exports postponed the crisis in the 1920s. But \tlhen
they started to dry up in 1928 and when the U.S. boom collapsed in the
great crash a year later, the lack of international leadership in the
world econany 100 to ITOst painful results, as the depression was
reinforcOO by domestic and international financial crises and
develoPed into the deepest and longest econanic crisis ever.
Great Britain had played the role of an international stabilizer in
the 19th century. 12 It provided for a relatively stable supply of
international ITOney, the Pound Sterling. 'Ihe British market was kept
OPen for imports. Whenever the d:xnestic econany slackened, foreign
exchange receipts from exports to Britain diminished for the rest of
the \\Urld. Britain made up for it by increasing capital exports, when
the slack in the domestic econany offered little investment
I
opportunities at horne. 'Ihe U.S., however, in terms cf economic and
financial power, in the post-World-War-One fericrl the natural heir cf
Great Britain I s lecrlership role, not only failed to p.rrsue free-trcrle
policies, but reacted to the first signs cf the Great Depression with
~1 further tariff increases (Smoot-Hawley Act cf June 1930). In ad:lition
to that, U.S. capital exports were not anticyclical, but procyclical,
Le. when the depression deePened, U.S. capital was withdrawn trom
abroad instead of being additionally exportOO. From hin::lsight, the
5
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consequences didn' t come by surprise. When F .D.R. was inaugurated in
March 1933, the I10netary system, the painstakirgly re-established gold
standard of the 1920s, was in shambles, trade restrictions had
expanded world-wide, 13 world exp:>rts had dropPed 't:If about two thirds
in value and about a quarter in real terms since 1929.14 U.S. exp:>rts
even went down to about half in real terms, while real U.S. GNP had
dropped by about 30 percent. 15
IH. Republican Policy Responses under T.R.
When President Willian McKinley was assassinated arxi T.R. succeeded
him in Sept. 1901, the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 was in force. It had
been drafted and passed in COlXJress 't:If the Republicans, immediately
after McKinley had taken over the White House fram the Democratic
President Cleveland. The Republicans instituted the highest tariffs in
American history until then. In i ts first full fiscal year of
operation the average rate on dutiable goods reached 52 percent and on
dutiable and free goods combined almest 30 percent. 16 The Dirgley
Tariff had the longest life of artj tariff act in American history , i t
remained in force throughout T.R. 's Presidency, and its successor, the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff that was enacted in 1909 was only slightly less
hostile to foreign competitors.
Yet durirg T.R.'s Presidency same reduction of the average
protective rate resulted from the fact that the price trend was \,lfMard
in the first deeade cf the 20th century, while maq{ tariffs were
expressed as specific instead of ad-valorem duties. Thus ~ 1908 the
average protective rate on dutiable goods had fallen to 43 perent and
on dutiable and free goods combined to 24 percent. 17 But the same
price rises also eroded the p..xrchasinJ power of consumers, as wage
increases could harclly keep pace with inflation. There was widespread
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public resentment cgainst the high tariffs as they ware regarded as a
boon to big industty at the expense of the majority of the
population. 18
After his triunphant re-election in 1904 T.R. himself considered
sane downward revision of the tariffs. Although loyal to the
'1
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protectionist dogma of the Republican Party that tariffs should cdjust
f or competitive differences between home arrl foreign producers, 19 he
became aware of tariff rate abuses that he wanted to fUt an errl to. He
soon realized, however, that "the high priests of protectionisn" were
too numerous and {XJWerful within bis party and that an all-out fight
for the issue "would have destr~ed bis effectiveness.1I20 He dropped
i t in exchange for Congressional support of bis railroad regulation
program which he considered more important. This is hardly surprising,
as T.R. 's ceterum censeo was repeated in his inaugural address in
March 1905: "The great developnent of industrialisn means that there
must be an increase in the superv ision exercised by the Government
over business-enterprise. 1I21 On this issue he had made promises to the
electorate, not on tariff revision, and, irrleed, histoty records bis
undisputed contributions to the "decline of laissez faire" in America,
while his "inability to alter the tariff starrls as one of the signal
failures of bis presidency .11 22
Although T.R. failed to move the U.5. towards the path of free
trade at a time when the American competitive position was already
stro~ enough to allow for such a policy, he bad recognized the vital
inportance of export markets for industrial America I s economi,c
developnent. He a:]reed with the analyses and recanmendations p.1blished
in the 1890s arrl shortly thereafter by Alfred T. Mahan and Brocks
Adams that - after the domestic frontier was closed - overseas
expansion of American commerce arrl political influence, protected by
sea fX'Wer, i.e. naval bases abroad arrl a strong navy, should c:pen a
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new frontier .23 Alrecdy as assistant secretary cf the navy in the
McKinley governrnent he advocated inperialistic expansion cf the D.S.
in the Pacific and in Central America to secure comnercial expansion
in Asia, mainly in China, and in South America. The Spanish-American
War of 1898 marked the final turnirg point toward the new imperialisrn
by the D.S. and T.R. did bis best to have America declare that war 00
Spain. As is well-known i t resulted in American vieto.ry and the
annexation cf Hawaii, Wake, Guam, the Philippines an:3. Puerto Rico an:3.
in short-term military and long-term poli tical control of CUba. Wi th
the new footholds for trade expansion in the Pacific, the Secretary cf
State in the McKinley government, John Hay, worried about trade-
discrimination in China, formulated the open-door principle, the
cornerstone of American trade policy in the 20th centu.ry, in his
fanous notes of 1899/1900 to each of the great powers. with an
influence on Chinese affairs. 24
When T.R. moved into the White House in Sept. 1901, the D.S.
already played i ts part in the concert of world powers and had
expressed i ts special interest in commercial expansion in Asia and
Latin America. During his presidency, T.R. advanced the cause of
America' s new imperialisrn forcefully. He was rot only driven by
econanic motivation, but also by the conviction that the Americans
should join the British in sharing "the white man's burden" of
spreadiI):J the fruits of advanced western civilization an:3. Anglo-Saxon
democratic ideals worldwide. He shared Mahan's view that "personal
liberty is a greater need than political independence,,25 and justifi~
American military inventions by pointing out: ''Our armies do nore than
bring peace, they bring freedan. Remerrber always, the independence of
a tribe or canmuni ty may often an:3. OOes have nothing to do with the




self-government and was willing to grant it on the condi tion that its
population ha:J learnt to govern accordi~ to western standards, Le.
establish law and order for the canmuni.ty, aIXi poli tical an::l e::oncxnic.
freedom for the indiv1dual.
In this spirit, T.R. withdrew American troops from Cuba in 1902
after he hcrl forced the Cubans to incorporate the Platt Amendm:mt into
their constitution. By its tenns , Cuba was not allowed to cooclude
international treaties that would inpair its iIXiependence or to incur
arry p..1blic debt for which its ordinary revenues ~re inadequate; and
Cuba consented to U.S. intervention, should that l:e necessary in the
future for "the maintainance of a government crlequate for protection
of life , property and individual li.berty"27 and to the sale or leasing
of land for an American naval base. Al though the Spanish-American War
hcrl been started with tremendous popular support to free Cuba from
SPanish oppression and to fight for a 11Olba-Libre11 , Le. for CXXTplete
Cuban independence, as i t was expressly urrlerlined by the Teller
Resolution in Congress in 1898, the independence now granted was a
mere formality; in substance Cuba l:ecarne an American protectorate.
Yet, T.R. and Congress literally also crlded a sweetener to the
bitter pill of dependence from America. A trade treaty with Cuba
shaped accordi~ to the reciprocity provisions for general tariff
reductions contained in Section 4 of the Dingley Act of 189728 becarne
effective in December 1903, shortly after Congress had passed a
special enabling act, which was n=cessary, as the Di~ley Act had
granted authorization for such treaties for two years only. U.S. goods
were cdmi.tted to the Cuban market under preferential treatment, Le.
at a general reduction of duties of 20 percent, and a long list of
sPeCified U.S. goods received the crlvantage of even a 25--40 percent
reduction. 29
In exchange Cuban goods, primarily sugar, could enter the U.S.
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market at a 20 percent reduction of duties, which in effect provided
for prosperity in the Cuban sugar industry during the following years.
This was similar to the treatment the Philippines rurl received for
their sugar since annexation by the U.S., while sugar arxi other export
products from Hawaii and Puerto Rico were admi tted totally duty-free
30 edinto the U.S., as these protectorates were includ into the U.S.
customs territory.
T.R. favored reciprocity agreements, not only with American
dependencies, but with other countries as well, includi.r'g the big
industrial rivals in Europe, in order to reduce the tariff wall around
the U.S. without changing the Tariff Act. U.S. tariffs in general were
f ar h igher than those in Europe. 31 Continental European countries ,
especially France, tended to l::e increasingly pt"otectionist after the
passage of the Dingley Act. France had a double column tariff, arrl by
applying the maximum rates to inports from the U.S. and the minimum
rates to those fran European countries had in fact created a zone of
preferential tariff treatment for intra-European trade and was
discriminating against the U.S., as did a nurrber of other European
countries. 32 In his first message to Congress in December 1901 T.R.
declared: "The phenomenal growth of arr export trade emphasizes the
urgency of the need... for a liberal p:>licy in dealing with foreign
nations. . .• The customers to \\hom we dispose of Olr surplus products
in the long run, directly or indirectly, purchase those surplus
products by giving us something in return. ,,33 T.R. borrowed the idea
from Brooks Adams who in his Atlantic Monthly article "Reciprocity or
_I the Alternative" argued that, as the trade balance shifted more and
more in America' s favor and against Europe, Europe would be put under
tremendous financial pressure and might therefore go to war with
America, unless the U.S. helPed the export of European products ~ a
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wise reciprocity policy.34
But although favoring a policy of reciprocal tariff reductions in
trade with other countries, T.R. continued to stand by the protective
principle his party was so strongly attached to. "Reciprocity must l:e
treated as the handmaiden cf protection. OUr first duty is to see that
the protection granted by the tariff in every case where it is needed
is maintained, and that reciprocity l:e sought for so far as it can
safely l:e done without injury to our horne industries, " T.R. declared
in his first message to Congress and likewise a year later in his
second. 35 This echoed the view of .the National Association of
Manufacturers expressed on a special "reciprocity convention" in
November 1901 36 and also of the Republican majority in Congress. The
Republicans in Congress had refused to ratify the rath~r far-reaching
reciprocity treaties under section 4 of the Dingley Act that were
similar to the 1903 arrangement with Cuba and that the special
reciprocity commissioner Kasson had negotiated with the UK an::l Denmark
for their possessions in the West Indies, with Nicaragua, Ecuador, the
Dominican Republic and Argentina, and most important of all with
France, whereby tariff rates on a wide range of products v.culd have
been reduced by up to twenty percent. 37
Section 3 of the Dingley Act provided for the legal basis on which
the T.R. government could conclude reciprocity ~reements without the
consent of Congress. But the authority was very limited. Wi th a view
to the export interests esPeCially of France, the President was
authorized to reduce tariffs on argols, crude tartar or wine lees, on
wines, brandies, spirits, champagne, paintings, and statuary I in each
case to sPeCified lower rates, in exchange for reciprocal concessions
by the contracting partner. 38 Such "argol agreements" had been
concluded with France, Germany, Portugal, Italy anj Switzerland,
before T.R. took office. Under his government the list was e.xtended to
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Great Britain, Bu1garia, Spain, arrl the Nether1ands am supp1ementary
agreements were reachOO with the first-mentionOO countries • But this
activity in reciprocity matters occurrOO on1y in bis second term of
office, fran 1906 to 1908, in reaction to the threat of increasiD;;1
European discrimination against American exports. 39 The Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act of August 1909, short1y after T.R. had 1eft office, errlOO
these agreements. Their economic effect was as limitOO as the
authorization of the executive for this purpose had been. 40 But -
aPart from two such treaties with Canada arrl Hawaii that bad been in
force in the 19th century - the "argo1 agreements" and the reciprocal
trade treaty with Cuba that lasted until susPensOO by a new trade
agreement in 1934, were "the only examples of negotiated tariff
agreements made effective by the Onited States tmtil after passage of
the Trade Agreements Act in 1934. ,,4 1
There was one more provision in section 3 of the Ding1ey Act that
100 to an i.rrportant resu1t tmder T.R. 's presidency. It authorized the
President to irnpose fenalty duties on the otherwise free1y admittOO
ilTports of coffee, tea, tonka and vani11a beans from oountries that
treatOO American products on a "reciprocal1y unequa1 and unreasonab1e"
basis. 42 This provision was directOO at Latin American trading
partners. Wi th the threat of irnposiD;;1 the penalty duty on the
substantia1 American j-mports of Brasilian coffee, the T.R.
Administration reached an tmderstandiD;;1 with Brazi1 in 1904, in which
Brazi1 granted a nurrber of tariff concessions to imports from the
V.S., most inportant of all for wheat flour. 43
-~ It must be borne in mirrl that all these reciprocal trade
arraIl:3ements were basOO on the oonditiona1 most-favored-nation clause,
wbich was the standard American interpretation of the most-favored-
nation princip1e until the 1920s. 44 This meant that tariff concessions
1 2
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by the U.5. reachOO in reciprocity agreements with ooe ex>untry were
extended to third m:>st favored nations only in exchange for ~valent
concessions 00 their Part. In practice, therefore, the reciprocity
agreements creatOO zones of preferential trade, in other \lK>rds trade
discrimination that the U.5. itself was fighting against with its
open-door policy. The trade treaty with Cuba of 1903 even expressly
statOO that the tariff concessions granted "shall be distinctly
preferential and shall be extendOO to no other nation. 1I45
T.R. 's rather limitOO success in reducing the extremely high Ameri-
can tariff walls ex>ntrastOO with his ex>nsiderable successes in de-
fending American interests in the promotion of U.5. exp:>rts. Upon the
1902 recanmendations of the Industrial Commission the U.5. consular
services were iItprovOO and the DePartment of Commerce (until 1913: and
Labor) was establishOO in 1903. 46 In foreign policy, T.R. advanced
U.5. influence in Latin America whose exp:>rts, mainly primary
products, entered. the U.5. mostiy free of duties, 4 7 with offensive and
even aggressive diplomacy. In December 1902 he actOO on the grounds
of the Monroe Doctrine and successfully forced. international
amitration in The Hague Tribunal in a ex>nflict between Great Britain,
Germany and Italy on the one hand and Venezuela under the dictator
Castro on the other OI/er foreign debts that had turned. sour. German
arrl British war ships had already blockaded. the principal ports of
Venezuela. and further military action leading to occupation seemed
imminent. T.R. didn't hesitate to force the Germans to accept
amitration under the threat of American naval action. 48 In 1903 he
supported a revolution that 100 to the independence of Panama from
Colunbia and paved the way for a treaty that granted the Panama canal
rights 49to the U.5. In 1904 T.R. pronounced the Roosevelt ex>rollary
to the Monroe Doctrine which declared that in cases of "chronic
wrongdoing, or an iITpotence \obich results in a general loosening of
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civilized society" (that is accordirg to American standards and
definitions), the U.S. would "exercise... an international police
power" in Latin America.50 This was done with a view to eliminate the
darger of European interventions with the fOssible consequence of
European zones of influence in Latin America.
After chaotic financial oonditions had broken out in Santo Domingo
in 1904 and the country was unahle to meet its foreign debt, T.R.
acted in accord with the newly defined principle arrl imposed an
agreement on Santo Domin;;o that provided for the U.S. collection of
Daninican customs duties and the funclin;; of the country ' 5 debts bt a
private American bankirg house, Kuhn, Loeb and Co. This was a m::xiel of
"dollar diplomacy" that came to full swing under T.R. '5 successor
William Howard Taft. 51
Twice T.R. appeared on the international scene as the successful
atbiter of peace, when the commercial and financial interests of great
powers conflicted in Asia and Africa. For his role in arbitratirg the
Treaty of Portsmouth of September 1905 that ended the Russian-Japanese
war in the Far Orient, he \o.Un the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1906. He
also played a key role in the 1906 Algeciras Conference that
terminated a conflict between Germany and France over influence in
Morocco. In both cases, he not only defended \o.Urld peace, but, fearful
of the European powers' strife for partitioned zones of influence in
China and North Africa, also American oommercial interest in the Open
Door. 52
.""1 IV. Democratic Policy Responses under F .D.R.
When F .D.R. took office in March 1933, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930 was in force. Al though the U.S. had emerged from the First
World War as a strorg creditor nation, the Republicans in 1921/22 had
, 4
reversed the do~ward trend of tariff protection that had been started
with the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 by Woodrow Wilson in
the White House and a Democratic majority in Corgress. When the Great
Depression was already under way, the Republicans raised tariff
protection even further and made i t the highest ever in American
economic history.53 It was answered with a sweep of retaliation by.
foreign tradirg partners and instigated even Great Britain to depart
further from her free-trade tradition arrl to introduce discriminatory
CanmorMealth preferences in the Ottawa cgreement of 1932. 54 The U.S.
saw i ts open-door policy in shambles. And especially the Democrats
believed that Republican tariff policy had significantly contributed
to the deepenirg of the Great Depression. In early 1932 a
I
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predominantly Democratic Corgress passed the Collier Bill which
provided for a unilateral reduction of u.s. tariffs, provisions for
reciprocal trcrle agreements arrl an international cx:mference 00 trade
questions. But President Hoover vetoed the Bill on May 11, 1932,
primarily on the grounds that "tbere has never been a time in the
history of the United States when tariff protectionwas more essential
to the welfare of the American people than at present.,,55
F .D.R., by training and conviction an internationalist, held
Republican trade and credit policies responsible for the depression in
the U.S. and in the world. In Septeni:>er 1932 he denounced the
Republican argument that econanic trouble in Europe ha::i inflicted the
depression on. the U.S. as "a classic of impertinence. ,,56 In his
election campaign he already favored tariff reductions 00 reciprocaJ.
terms and announced a "new deal in the restoration of foreign
trade. ,,57 Democrats and Republicans shared the view that the U.S.
econcxny needed unrestricted world markets, not only for the
procurernent of raw materials, but also for the sale of agricultural
1 5
arrl industrial surplus prcxiucts. A policy af autarky, like that
practiced by Germany and Italy in the 19305, was therefore not a
policy option suited to the U.S. econany. The Democrats believed,
however, that U.S. exports in the long nm could expand smoothly ooly
if the American market would be opened to imports sufficiently to
balance the trade accounts. The Republicans, in contrast, had [11rsued
a policy of highly protecting the horne market and of expanding U.S.
exports by extending credit abroad. 58
There was some tug of war within the Democratic Party over how to
win export markets and at the same time balance the trade accounts.
The forernost spokesman of the internationalist position, Cordell Hull,
advocated the multilateral approach based on the unconditional most-
favored-nation principle, while other influential Democrats of more
nationalist orientation, prominent among thern George N. Peek, Raymond
Moley, and Rexford G. Tugwell, favored a rrore bilateral approach to
foreign trade, Le. "pushing exports through I horse-trading', guid .EE2.
goo, nation by nation, ,,59 an approach based on the conditional instead
of the unconditional rrost-favor~nationprinciple.
The "nationalists" considered the domestic causes of the crisis
more important than those in international trade which were Hull's
favorite culprit. They didn't want to endaI'XJer the domestic program of
the New Deal, the introduction of a managed national econorny, by
simultaneously opening up the U.S. market to imports. And irrleed,
F .D.R. followed their crlvice in 1933 am stated: "Our international
trade relations, though vastly inportant, are in point of time aoo
necessity, secondary to the establistJnent of a sound national eco~.
I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first. ,,60
On these grounds he bad refused to exx>perate with President Hoover
who urged the new President-elect to support his efforts at
61international cooperation to stern the tide of fallil'lCJ world trade; <
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and in the sumner of 1933 - by refusing arrj agreement on exchange rate
stabilization - he torpedoed the chances of success for the World
Econamic Conference in Lorxion, where secretary of State Cordell Hull
had hoped to reach an international agreement on the reduction of
trade restrictions. 62
F .D.R. 's tenporary departure fram bis basically internationalist
position was also due to provisions in the National Industrial
Recovery Act arxi the Agricultural Adjustment Act that ran munter to
liberalizing American trade. They "authorized the irnposition of bigher
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on i.lTports if they interfered
with domestic programs designed to raise prices of i ndustrial and
agricultural products, ,,63 and F.D.R. actually increased the tariff on
cotton products in May 1933.
What changedF.D.R.'s mind in late 1933 to end bis procrastination
on the trade policy issue? F.D.R. 's decision in April 1933 to take the
dollar off gold arxi let it devalue, although international in effect,
was motivated by bis damestic goal of reversing the fallirg trend of
U.S. agricultural prices. It antagonized foreign tradirg partners who
saw no justification for such a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy move
except in a balance-of-payments crisis which the U.S. didn't have.
When F.D.R. signaled serious attention to foreign trade issues by
creating the interdepartrnental Executive Committee on Commercial
Policy in early Noverrber 1933,64 the dollar had already devalued
almost to the extent of 41 percent vis-a-vis gold, the rate at wbich
i t was stabilized again in January 1934. But agricultural prices were
."
"'1
-I still depressed arxi therefore o:mmercial policy as a supplementary
remedy for the crisis became attractive to F .D.R. at that time. In
Decerrber 1933 at the Seventh International Conference of American
States at Montevideo, Cordell Hull achieved what he had failed to
1 7
obtain at the Lomon World Econamic Conference. A resolution was
unanimously adopted that "calIed for the reduction of tariffs an:i the
removal of quantitative restrictons through bilateral or multilateral
agreements, all such agreements to include the uncorxtitional MFN
clause. 1I65
Shortly thereafter the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Bill was drafted
arrl F .D.R. asked Congress to legislate it on March 2, 1934. It was
enacted - cgainst opposition especially frorn the Republicans, but also
fram sone "nationalists" in the Democratic Party - with F .D.R. 's
signature on June 12, 1934, as an amendment to the Srnoot-Hawley Act of
1930. It was a sort of enablin;} act, as Congress delegated its
traditional power to set the tariff rates to the President for a
period of three years, thus freeing tariff negotiations from
COn;}ressional log-rolling. The Administration was empcwered to lower
(or raise) the Srnoot-Hawley rates by 50 percent in reciprocal trade
agreements with foreign governments on the basis of the uncorrlitional
most-favored-nation principle. Al though CordeIl Hull would have
favored even a unilateral reduction cf U.S. tariffs, he was quite
happy to settle with the next best solution. On the signin;} of the Act
Hull commented in his memoirs: "My fight of so many IOn;} years for the
reciprocal trade policy and the lowerin;} of trade barriers was \toOn. To
say I was delighted 15 a bold understatement. ,,66 Congress extend.ed the
authority provided by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1937,
1940, 1943, and in the post-World-War-II period, in which it l:ecame
the legal basis of American GATl' policies. Thus its original passage
in 1934 truly marked the beginnin;} of a new American approach to trade
,
... !
policy, away from the traditional protective principle towards
liberalism arrl multilateralism in foreign trade. 67
In the execution of the Trade Agreements Program Hull won his
battle with bis nationalist adversary in the administration and in the
1 8
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formulation of the Trade Act, George N. Peek, who in view of the
reality of trcrle relations in the world still favored a strictly
bilateral approach to trcrle agreements and scorned at Hull' s
multilateral view. 68 Until the errl of 1937, COrdell Hull managed to
conclude 16 trcrle agreements coverin;;J Olle third of American foreign
trade,69 especially with Canada arrl Latin American countries. By 1940
22 agreements hcrl been concluded, by 1945 even 29. Amon;;J the European
industrial countries, prewar a:Jreements were reached with Finland,
Sweden, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia
and especially Great Britain. London even conceded a certain lowerin;;J
of the Commonwealth trade barriers, Le. an easing of the
I
discriminatory policy started with the Ottawa agreement of 1932. But
Japan and Germany, the aggresors in the second World War, were
excluded fran the program. Cordell Hull who continued to emphasize
that his trade program contributed not only to world prosperity , but
also to world peace, thus failed to meet the ultimate test of his
hypothesis.
F .D.R.'s and Hull's reciprocal trade program as well as the Export-
IlTPort Bank, founded in 1934 in support of U.S. foreign trade,
provided for a tool not only to crlvance U.S. cOl11llercial' interests
proper, but also to pursue the political goal of establishing American
leadership in bin:ii.n;;J Western dernocracies together vis-a':vis the
threat to Western ideals emanatin;;J from fascist and militaristic
countries like Germany, Italy and Japan. 70
At the same time F .D.R. reversed American policy in Latin America
'·1
.-{ and substituted his policy of good neighborhood for the T.R.-like
imperialism of dollar diplomacy and unilateral military action. 71
Although as assistant secretary of the Navy durin;;J and after World War
I, F.D.R. still had been in favor of such hard-line imperialism, he
1 9
came to realize in the late 1920s that the p:>litical ill will it had
created in Latin American countries rotweighed the economic benefits
to the V.S. F .D.R. 's Latin American policies, therefore, ran ex>unter
to those ofT.R., most visible in 1934, whenF.D.R. abrogated the
Platt Amendrnent, thereby renouncinJ to the U.S. r ight of intervention
in CUba, withdrew the Marines from Haiti aOO approved of the Tydings-
McDuffie Act providinJ for Philippine in::iePendence in ten years. 72
In 1943, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles praised the
--/
• I
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as "one spot of sanity in a world
outlook that seerned wholly arrl hopelessly dark. ,,73 But did the
reciprocal tra::J.e agreements prograrn reach the desired results? Its
advocates, eSPecially CordeIl Hull, but also F .D.R. himself, pointed
out that V.S. foreign trade with trade-agreement countries grew faster
than that with other countries in the years up to World War 11. 74 But
the prograrn failed to meet the goal of balancing V.S. trade accounts.
The surplus in the V.S. mercharrlise trade balance more than doubled
f rom 475 million dollars in 1934 to around one billion dollars in 1938
arrl 1939. 75 This was partly due to the underlying principle for
American tariff concessions, narnely that V.S. tariffs should be cut
prirnarily for those products that were not or little produced in
America. 76 Their reduction, therefore, benefittOO foreign suppliers
an::l domestic users of those products alike, but 100 to relatively
little increase in ilrports, as there were no or only few dornestic
suppliers to be displacOO.
A second principle underlyirg the agreements erodOO in practice the
value of the uncon::litional rrost-favored-nation treatment that the V.S.
ha::i made the c:ornerstone of its new trade polic.y. Tariff ex>ncessions
were granted on those products for which the c:ontractinJ partner was
the main supplier 00 the V.S. market artjway. Thus the practical value
of extending these concessions to other most-favorOO nations
20
automatically was minimal. 77 Hull himsei"{ pointed this out in 1937:
" on the basis of 1934 trade figures, the value of our exports
safeguarded from discrimination because we receive rrost-favored-nation
treatment from other countries was 00 less than Dollars 265,000,000,
while the value of our imports from third oountries to which we have
generalized trade agreement concessions, amounted to about
30,000,000 •.•The ratio of direct and national benefit from our
adherence to the principle of ~lity cf treatment has been 9 to 1 in
our favor." 78
In addition, safeguards a;;Jainst too much foreign competition were
attached to the trade agreements program in theory and practice. The.
1934 Act provided for the susPenSion of tariff concessions which
"cause or threaten serious injury" to domestic producers. This was a
predecessor of the so-called escape clause that was incorporated into
the arsenal of U.S. foreign trade policy instruments in 1947. 79 And in
practice, the U.S. also applied inport quotas, although these, when
practiced by other countries, i t considered the greatest threat to its
own exports. Hull himself admi tted in Congress in 1940: "Where
necessary, as an additional safeguard, we have limited the amount cf
irrports which would be permitted to come in at the reduced rate of
duty .,,80
Thus in spite of all the rhetoric about non-discrimination an::i
multilateralism, the initial practical outcome of F.D.R. '5 and Hull's
new trade policy approach was bilateral favors anj factual
discrimination of third countries • All in all, the effects of the
./
-" Trade Agreements Program on domestic economic activity in the U.S. an::i
on foreign trade have been ju1ged as rather rrodest an::i limited up to
the Secon::i World War. 81
21
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Y....:... Comparative SUßlllary arxi Conclusions
No doubt, T.R. as weH as F.D.R. were both quite aware of tbe
inportance of international trade for o.s. economic growth. In spite
of their different party affiliations, they both recognized that a too
protective o.s. trcde policy endargered the U.S. national interest in
open and expanding foreign markets. They both fought for the Open
Door, albeit in quite different economic environments anj with quite
different approaches to o.s. imperialism or leadership. 'lbey both
promoted trade policies -based on the reciprocity principle, although,
their main concem in economic policy rested with domestic matters,
like control of ITOnopoly power even in both cases. T.R. as weH as
F .D.R. took a special interest in pranoting economic ties with Latin
America, but both recognized the need of avoidin;} increasin;l trade
barriers in trade relations with the industrialized European
-'1
./
countries. Th€y both declared themselves in favor of the cost-
equalization approach of tariff-setting and advocated tariff
reductions only insofar, as these would mt hurt dcxnestic production.
They disapproved cf the lcq-roHing process involved in Congressional
decisions on tariff rates arrl favored a arrtailment cf Congressional
authority in these matters. 82
Wben T.R. took office bis p::Mer to conclude reciprocal trade
agreements, the argel agreements, was extremely narrow, an::l for tariff
concessions beyon::J that he was dependent on congressional approval.
T .R. 's failure to ask COn;}ress for a new trade act - with possibly
reduced tariff rates arrl/or greater authority for the President to
conclude trade ~reernents - has l:::een nentioned. F .D.R., in contrast,
asked and received fran Congress a broader authority for trade
agreements than the legislature bad ever granted to apresident. For




of the stage of developnent an:] of the economic structure the u.s. had
attained, was obviously out of reach due to the protectionist
orientation so deep-rooted in the Republican Party CIld due to the.
absence of severe econanic shocks that often play the role of a
mi~ife for basic changes in econanic fX)licy. F .D.R., in contrast,
could count on the traUtional opposition of his party to the
extremely protective trade policies cf the Republicans an:] on the
great depression to support his revolutionary change in trade fX)licies
as an anergency measure.
During T.R. I S presidency the protectionist dogma cf the Republicans
developed into eVen theoretical nonsense, when the cost-equalization
formula for tariff rates was made the official doctrine for settin'J
tariff rates in the Republican Party platforms for the presidential
elections in 1904 and 1908.83 Minimal presidential authority for
reciprocal - tariff reductions, still based 00 the conditional most-
favored-nation principle, were at that time a diet ill-suited to the
mature economic 1xx1y cf the u.s. with its great competitive fOwer an:]
a leading pos i tion in the world. But as a vigorous ferson can get ~
with the wrong diet for quite a while, the American and the world
econ~ kept growing stron'Jly Wlile T.R. was president and beyond.
Only later, in the 1920s, the harmful effects cf the Republican
protectionist diet became rrore apparent. Already in 1923, with the
Republicans in fX)wer, U.s. trade fX)licy crlopted the unconditional
most-favored-nation principle; but it didn1t affect the tariff rates,
these were then not negotiable. 84
In contrast F.D.R.ls very broad authority to reduce tariffs in
connection with the unconditional most-favored-nation treatment
provided for the right diet that sui ted the needs cf the u.s. am
world economic 1xx1y. But again it took a very long time, before the
then ailing patient fully reacted to the new treatment. The triumph of
23
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F.D.R.'s and Cordeil Hull's trade policy didn't occur until after
World War 11; the foundation of the GATI' in 1947 umer American
leadership, based on the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, was the real breakthrough tcMards a truly multilateral reduction
of trade barriers. It was rewarded by vigorous growth of the economies
and of world trade for the next 25 years.
b
If there is a lesson to draw from these experiences, i t is that
trade policy traditions tend to be rather s ticky • But when basic
shifts occur, i t also takes a long time for their effects to become
fully visible. Even F .D.R. who remained in the White House longer than
any other American president, did not live to see the triumph of his
1934 trade policy innovation in the p:riod after World War Ir.
So today our economies might digest doses of the "new




depression. Those of our present politicians who contribute to bar or
to promote protectionism are unlikely to reap the froits of their
actions while still in office. But let's oope that they act with a
strong sense of responsibility in these matters nevertheless •
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